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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appellate proceeding arises from the Fifth District Court's determination that 
Appellant, Richard Daday, is not entitled to overtime benefits pursuant to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this proceeding 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Where R.D. Logging failed to keep any wage records, was Daday's 
testimony that he worked in excess of 60 hours per week, prime facie evidence of his 
entitlement to overtime benefits? 
Standard: The trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for 
correctness. See, S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1999); Orton v. Carter, 970 
P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation for appeal: This issue was raised by Daday in his trial brief (R. 51-5), 
and in closing arguments made to the trial court. (R.73 at 4-12). 
Issue 2: Where R.D. Logging had signed interrogatories indicting Daday worked 
45 hours per week, then argued for the first time during closing argument that he worked 
only 40 hours per week, was the Court's refusal to reopen the record to admit the answer 
inappropriate? 
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Standard: A motion to reopen to take additional evidence is left to the sound 
discretion of the Court. Ross v. Leftwich, 377 P'.2d 495 (Utah 1963). 
Preservation for Appeal: This issue was raised by Daday in closing arguments (R. 
73 at 23-7). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
29 U.S.C. §207 (a)(1) is the applicable statute relative to overtime pay under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act and is attached, in relevant part, at Addendum "A". 
29 C.F.R. §516.2 is the applicable federal regulation relative to records to be kept 
by employers and is attached in full at Addendum "B". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: The appellant, Richard Daday, seeks review of the Fifth 
District Court's denial of his claim for overtime wages for work performed while working 
for appellee, R.D. Logging, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
Course of Proceedings: On August 25, 1999, appellant, Daday, filed a complaint in 
Fifth District Court in Washington County claiming entitlement to overtime benefits 
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act claiming overtime compensation in the amount 
of 528,080.00 for wages owed from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 1998, for 
liquidated damages in the amount of $28,080.00 for the same time period, and for 
attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act. (R. 4-5). 
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This matter was tried before the Fifth District Court in St. George, Utah, on 
February 20-21, 2001, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham presiding. (R. 59; See also, 
Addendum "C" at 1, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the trial judge). 
The trial judge entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 30, 2001, 
denying Daday's claim for payment of overtime wages, liquidated damages, and attorney 
fees and costs. (R. 59-64. See also, Addendum "C" at 1-6). 
Daday filed a Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2001. (R. 68-9). That appeal was to 
the Utah Supreme Court. On August 7, 2001, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court entered the following findings of fact: 
1. Plaintiff was, at all relevant times, a resident of Washington County, Utah. 
(R. 59; See also, Addendum "C" at 1). 
2. Defendant was, at all relevant times, a Utah corporation having its principle 
place of business in Washington County, Utah. (R. 59-60; See also Addendum "C" at 1-
2). 
3. Plaintiff worked as an employee of Defendant from January 1998 through 
March 19, 1999. (R. 60; See also Addendum "C" at 2). 
4. Defendant's business is the fabrication of custom cabinets and furniture, 
some of which have been sold in interstate commerce. (R. 60; See also Addendum "C" 
at 2). 
5. Defendant [sic] was paid on a weekly basis, and was paid $720 each week 
of his employment by Defendant, except for the last week thereof; Defendant [sic] was 
never paid any overtime compensation. (R. 60; See also Addendum "C" at 2). 
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6. Plaintiff was originally employed by Defendant to be manager of 
Defendant's shop; Plaintiff testified, "I [could] run it [the shop] as though it were my 
own." (R. 60; See also Addendum "C" at 2). 
7. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant kept records of Plaintiff s work hours; 
Defendant tried to get Plaintiff to record his work hours, but Plaintiff refused to do so. 
(R. 60; See also Addendum "C" at 2). 
8. Plaintiff testified that he consistently worked more than forty hours per 
week for Defendant. Plaintiff testified that sixty hours per week, "is a real safe average," 
but Plaintiff had no credible evidence of any specific number of hours worked in any 
specific week. The Court finds this testimony to be speculative, unsubstantiated, and 
unreliable. (R. 60; See also Addendum "C" at 2). ' 
9. Plaintiffs wife testified that Plaintiff worked many hours at Defendant's 
shop, but had no credible evidence of any specific number of hours worked in any 
specific week. (R. 60; See also Addendum "C" at 2). 
10. Plaintiff testified that he began work at 6:30 a.m., but witness Richard 
Carnley testified that Plaintiff arrived no earlier than 7:00 a.m. (R. 60; See also 
Addendum "C" at 2). 
11. Plaintiff testified that his "average" work day ended at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. 
Witness Gary Slease testified that, on certain unidentified occasions, he saw Plaintiff 
working at Defendant's shop as late as 6:00 p.m., but he could not testify about what 
work Defendant was doing. Witness Carnley testified that Plaintiff was at the shop 
longer than other employees. (R. 61; See also Addendum "C" at 3). 
12. Plaintiff testified that he worked six or seven days per week until February 
1999. Defendant's witnesses testified that Sunday work was never required by Defendant 
and that Saturday work was virtually never required. The Court finds that Plaintiffs 
testimony is unreliable and is rebutted by more credible evidence. (R. 61; See also < 
Addendum "C" at 3). 
13. Plaintiff worked for Defendant for more than one year before claiming any 
entitlement to overtime compensation. (R. 61; See also Addendum "C" at 3). 
14. Plaintiff spent significant time on personal work, not for Defendant, during 
the normal work hours of the shop; for example, Plaintiff built furniture to exchange for 
his own automotive repairs and built doors to trade for his own countertops. (R. 61; See 
also Addendum "C" at 3). 
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15. Plaintiff also parked his own travel trailer next to Defendant's shop, and 
worked on the reconstruction and remodeling of its interior during the normal work hours 
of Defendant's shop; witness Carnley testified that he saw improvements made by 
Plaintiff to his trailer which would have required three or four complete weeks of work to 
accomplish, and others of Defendant's employees who testified had witnessed Plaintiff 
working on his trailer during the normal work hours of the shop. (R. 61; See also 
Addendum "C" at 3). 
16. Defendant's representative, Barratt Nielson, testified that Plaintiff did not 
work the sixty hours per week that he claims because Plaintiff was working on his trailer 
during the normal work hours of the shop; witness Nielson further testified that he twice 
told Plaintiff to stop working on personal projects during work hours. (R. 62; See also 
Addendum "C" at 4). 
17. Plaintiff testified that he took smoking breaks while at work, that he never 
smoked in the shop, and that he smoked a pack of cigarettes per day. (R. 62; See also 
Addendum "C" at 4). 
18. Defendant adopted its first policy regarding sick leave and vacations on 
January 6, 1999, two months before the end of Plaintiff s employment with Defendant. 
(R. 62; See also Addendum "C" at 4). 
The Court entered the following conclusions of law: 
A. Plaintiffs employment with Defendant was subject to the requirements of 
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FSLA") [sic]. (R. 62; See also Addendum "C" at 
4). 
B. Defendant violated provisions of the FSLA [sic] by failing to keep records 
of Plaintiff s work hours. (R. 62; See also Addendum "C" at 4). 
C. In these circumstances, Plaintiff still has the burden to prove "that [he] has 
in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and produce[] 
sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and 
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reasonable inference." 48A AmJur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations §4657. (R. 62; See 
also Addendum "C" at 4). 
D. Plaintiffs testimony regarding his working of more than forty hours per 
week is speculative, it fails to account for the time he took for smoking breaks and 
worked on personal projects rather than for Defendant, and is contradicted by more 
credible evidence., Plaintiff specifically testified, "You can't imagine the hours I put in 
that place," but then left it to this Court to do that imagining. (R. 62-3; See also 
Addendum "C" at 4-5). 
E. Plaintiff has failed to bear his burden of proof for overtime compensation. 
(R. 63; See also Addendum "C" at 5). 
F. Defendant's policy for sick leave and vacations was not retroactive, and 
Plaintiff had no entitlement to compensation thereunder when his employment was 
terminated. (R. 63; See also Addendum "C" at 5). 
G. Judgment should be entered for Defendant, with no award to Plaintiff, and 
the parties should bear their own costs and attorneys fees. (R. 63; See also Addendum 
" C " a t 5 ) . ; , , . r e - : - / . ' - . ••• •/'• 
H. Counsel for Defendant should submit an appropriate judgment pursuant to 
Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. (R. 63; See also Addendum "C" at 
5). 
During closing arguments, and for the first time, R.D. Logging argued that Daday 
was working less than 40 hours per week, as indicated by the record: 
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MR. BRINDLEY: Going to the legal issues, Your Honor, we 
believe that per the Fair Labor Standards Act, Mr. Daday is [sic] entitled to 
overtime compensation simply because any hours that he was working at 
the shop in excess of the 40 hours a week were dedicated to personal 
projects or personal time spent in the trailer." (R. 73 at 20). 
At that point in time, the following objection was made: 
Your Honor, I'm going to object to this for the mere reason we had 
answers in our discovery requests, answers to interrogatories where we 
asked what the claim was, the amount of wage, the amount of time that my 
client worked there. Communication was they felt it was 45 hours per 
week. And there's not been evidence anywhere of less than 45. I didn't 
offer the interrogatories. But this is a new defense that I never heard before 
that it could be under 40 hours per week. They bound themselves to at least 
45 hours per week in interrogatories. Now I'm hearing this for the first 
time it's 40 hours or under. We have a specific request - - we asked them, 
"State how many hours plaintiff worked on a weekly basis from January 1 
to December 31." 
"Plaintiff worked an average of 45 hours per week." 
THE COURT: But that's not in evidence. 
MR. PRISBREY: I understand it's not in evidence. But I think he is 
estopped from raising these other arguments were he's saying, well, it could 
have been 40 hours per week. I didn't put it on because I didn't think they 
had any evidence that got anywhere close to 40 hours per week. But I just 
think it's inappropriate where they made that admission in legal paperwork, 
now he's arguing it otherwise. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll allow the argument to continue. I have to 
deal with the evidence that is presented. (R. 73 at 20-1). 
Thereafter, trial counsel moved the court to reopen the evidence to include the 
interrogatory response as follows: 
MR. PRISBREY: Your Honor, we did have some answers to 
interrogatories. I did not put those on in my case in chief. I didn't think 
there was any evidence presented that Mr. Daday worked under 45 hours 
per week. I was aware of that admission. I would ask that the record be 
opened so we could simply provide the Court with a copy of the answers to 
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interrogatories of the admission that was made, because I wasn't aware of 
that until we were sitting here in closing statements, that that was even 
contemplated. 
THE COURT: All right. That's a motion to reopen the evidence? 
MR. PRISBREY: Yes. Simply for the purpose of entering a 
response to one interrogatory which was responded to by Mr. Nielsen. 
THE COURT: Okay. What's the law regarding reopening evidence 
once the case is closed? 
MR. PRISBREY: It's my understanding, Your Honor, that the case 
can be reopened if there is adequate basis to do so. 
THE COURT: It sounds like one of those basis that sounds really 
good to an appellate court, which really means we'll let you know later 
what the standard is. Is there any actual standard? 
MR. PRISBREY: I'm not aware of it. 
THE COURT: It [sic] there a rule that governs that? If you know 
without looking. I don't recall myself. 
MR. PRISBREY: I don't, You Honor. It's just my understanding of 
if there's ever - - if you are in trial, if you are in closing statements, or any 
point in time if an issue arises, obviously, you have to raise it at that point. 
I think an issue's arisen for the first time in closing arguments. And we just 
want to supplement what we think was in our case. I don't think there was 
any evidence to support the position that he worked under 40 hours per 
week, under 45 hours per week for that matter. But I think that counsel has 
estopped himself from making that argument when he signed 
interrogatories himself saying, Oh, we thmk he worked 45 hours per week. 
And that was my point, Your Honor, I think, on that basis. We should be 
entitled to the record on that one limited issue. We don't want all the 
interrogatories, just the answer on that one. '"*•• 
THE COURT: Um-hmm. Mr. Brindley, what about the motion? 
MR. BRINDLEY: Your Honor, that motion should be denied. The 
evidence has been closed. I would simply argue to conform to the evidence 
that came on at trial. 
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THE COURT: Oh, so you are suggesting you just modify your 
argument to the - - you were arguing the evidence as it came out at trial or 
you would argue that - -
MR. BRINDLEY: Yes. No, I did. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you know if there's a rule governing 
reopening the evidence? 
MR. BRINDLEY: I'm not familiar with that rule. 
THE COURT: I'm not either. All right. For the sake of the 
argument of the motion, is it correct that there is an interrogatory answer 
somewhere that says that the defendant didn't work more than 45 hours per 
week? 
MR. PRISBREY: I believe so, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Would reopening the evidence then mean 
that your client would then want to respond or explain that answer? 
MR. PRISBREY: Urn, possibly. 
THE COURT: Anything further on the motion, Mr. Prisbrey? 
MR. PRISBREY: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I'll have to take the motion under 
advisement. I don't think the fact of the interrogatory answer is at issue. I 
don't know whether this is sufficient ground to reopen the evidence. So I'll 
just have to see what I can find on that. 
MR. PRISBREY: Your Honor, I don't have a question on 
(inaudible) the issue. Would it be all right if I made a proffer as to the [sic] 
relative to the interrogatory? 
THE COURT: Sure, if there's more than what I've already been 
told. 
MR. PRISBREY: I don't know if I - -1 don't know if I read the 
whole interrogatory. I just want to make sure we have a record on that. 
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THE COURT: You just mentioned it. 
MR. PRISBREY: Discovery [sic], if we present evidence on this 
issue, Your Honor, the evidence would show that on January 26th of 2000,1 
received in my office a document entitled Defendant's Responses to 
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories to Defendants, which is a 15 page 
document which was signed and notarized. It was signed by Barrett 
Nielsen on January 21 and notarized by Jean Smith, a notary public on that 
day. And interrogatory number 47, asked the question, "State how many 
hours plaintiff worked on a weekly basis from the time period January 1, 
1998 to December 31, 1999." 
"ANSWER: Plaintiff worked an average of 45 hours per week. And 
that was also signed on page 15 by Brent Brindley as attorney for 
defendant, R.D. Logging Company. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(R. 73 at 20-7). 
The Court, in issuing its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law did not address 
Plaintiffs motion to reopen the evidence. It is presumed to have been denied. In 
footnote 1 the Court states that, "the findings made here are only those 
necessary for the Court's ultimate conclusion." (R. 59; See also Addendum "C" at 1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court determined that Daday was entitled to protection under the FLSA. 
The tnal court also found that R.D. Logging violated federal law in failing to keep 
personnel or payroll records for Daday. Where an employer fails to comply with its 
statutory duty to keep proper records, the employee need only present a prime facia case 
that he has performed work for which he was improperly compensated and the court must 
consider that evidence and the "just and reasonable inference" from the evidence in favor 
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of the employee. Here, Daday testified that he worked in excess of 60 hours per week. 
This testimony was supported by that of his wife. However, the trial court held that 
testimony was insufficient to meet Daday's burden. The Court was wrong. The case law 
is clear that an employee meets his burden of going forward with oral testimony and 
nothing else. 
Secondly, R.D. Logging had answered interrogatories indicating Daday was 
working 45 hours per week. However, during closing arguments, R.D. Logging, in spite 
of its answers, argued Daday worked only 40 hours per week. There had been no 
witnesses that had testified to that fact and certainly no records to support that conclusion. 
When that allegation was made, Daday argued to the Court that R.D. Logging was 
estopped from arguing anything different than it had answered in interrogatories. The 
trial Court denied that motion. Then Daday moved to reopen the evidence to enter the 
interrogatory answer into evidence. The Court ignored that motion and entered judgment 
against Daday, specifically finding there was insufficient evidence to support Daday's 
claim he was working more than 40 hours per week. That finding is obviously 
contradicted by R.D. Logging's interrogatory answer. There is no legitimate basis why 
the Court would not reopen the record to allow one single interrogatory answer into 
evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY IN 
FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS TO THE EMPLOYEE. 
This Court: has set forth the purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act: 
Congress enacted FLSA recognizing that, "due to the unequal bargaining 
power" between employees and employers, mandatory legislation was 
necessary to prevent private contracts between employees and employers 
which endanger national health and commercial efficiency. Brooklyn Sav. 
Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706, 65 S.Ct. 895, 902, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945). 
In particular, the legislative history of FLSA shows that Congress intended 
to protect employees from substandard wages and excessive work hours. Id. 
For this purpose, standards of minimum wages and maximum work hours 
were imposed. O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 707, 65 S.Ct. at 902. 
Druffner v. Mrs. Fields, Inc., 828 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In applying FLSA, certain fundamental principles must be recognized. The Act 
was passed for humanitarian and remedial purposes, A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 
U.S. 490, 493, 89 L. Ed. 1095, 65 S. Ct. 807 (1945); it must be liberally construed "to 
apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction," Mitchell v. Lublin, 
McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207, 211, 3 L. Ed. 2d 243, 79 S. Ct. 260 (1959); and 
breadth of coverage is vital to the Act's mission, Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 
339 U.S. 497, 516, 94 L. Ed. 1017, 70 S. Ct. 755 (1950). 
In this case, the district court judge, in rendering his Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law did not properly apply this vital rule of "liberal construction." This 
is evidenced by the trial court's ignorance of the appropriate standard to be applied 
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i 
regarding the burdens of proof of the respective parties. Additionally, the trial court 
certainly did not liberally apply the act by refusing to allow Daday to open the record to 
submit one interrogatory answer which would support Daday's position that he worked in 
excess of 40 hours per week. The entire order of the district court order should be 
disregarded for these conceptual flaws. 
II. 
WHERE R.D. LOGGING FAILED TO KEEP WAGE RECORDS, DADAY'S 
TESTIMONY THAT HE WORKED IN EXCESS OF 60 HOURS PER WEEK 
WAS PRIME FACIE EVIDENCE OF HIS ENTITLEMENT TO OVERTIME 
BENEFITS 
A. DADAY IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTIONS OFFERED UNDER FLSA 
In relevant part, 29 U.S.C. §207 (a)(1) provides that: 
No employer shall employ any of his employees who in any work week is 
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is 
employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of 
goods for commerce, for a work week longer than 40 hours unless such 
employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours 
above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular 
rate at which he is employed. 
Addendum "A" at 1. 
The trial court concluded that, "Plaintiffs employment with Defendant was 
subject to the requirements of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FSLA")[sic]. (R. 
59; See also, Addendum "C" at 4). Pursuant to the above authority and findings by the 
trial court, Daday was an employee of R.D. Logging entitled to compensation at the rate 
of one and one half times his regular rate of $18.00 per hour for all overtime work. 
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B. R.D. LOGGING DID NOT MAINTAIN ANY OF DADAY'S WAGE RECORDS 
The trial court determined that in violation of federal law, R.D. Logging failed to 
maintain Daday's records. (R. 62; See also, Addendum "C" at 4). Obviously, if these 
records would have been kept, there would have been no difficulty in determining the 
amount of time that Daday had worked overtime. It was not simply an oversight for R.D. 
Logging to fail to keep Daday's records. There are numerous records R.D. Logging 
failed to keep in violation of Federal law. In relevant part, Federal Regulations requires 
employers to keep the following records: 
1. Time of day and day of week on which the employee's workweek 
begins. 
29C.F.R. §516.2(a)(5) (1998). 
2. Regular hourly rate of pay for any workweek in which overtime 
compensation is due under section 7(a) of the Act, (ii) explain basis of pay 
by indicating the monetary amount paid on a per hour, per day, per week, 
per piece, commission on sales, or other basis, and (iii) the amount and 
nature of each payment which, pursuant to section 7(e) of the Act, is 
excluded from the "regular rate" (these records may be in the form of 
vouchers or other payment data). 
29 C.F.R. §516.2(a)(6)(i) (1998). 
3. Hours worked each workday and total hours worked each workweek (for 
purposes of this section, a "workday" is any fixed period of 24 consecutive 
hours and a "workweek" is any fixed and regularly recurring period of 7 
consecutive workdays). 
29 C.F.R. §516.2 (a)(7)(1998). 
4. Total daily or weekly straight-time earnings or wages due for hours 
worked during the workday or workweek, exclusive of premium overtime 
compensation. 
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29 C.F.R. §516.2 (a)(8)(1998). 
5. Total premium pay for overtime hours. This amount excludes the 
straight-time earnings for overtime hours recorded under paragraph (a)(8) 
of this section 
29 C.F.R. §516.2 (a)(9)(1998) 
6. Total additions to or deductions from wages paid each pay period 
including employee purchase orders or wage assignments. Also, in 
individual employee records, the dates, amounts, and nature of the items 
which make up the total additions and deductions 
29 C.F.R. §516.2 (a)(10)(1998). 
7. Total wages paid each pay period 
29 C.F.R. §516.2 (a)(ll)(1998). 
8. Date of payment and the pay period covered by payment. 
29 C.F.R. §516.2 (a)(12)(1998). 
In this situation, R.D. Logging, in clear violation of federal law, destroyed or failed 
to keep any of the numerous documents regarding the amount of time Daday spent 
working. It should not be permitted to take advantage of that illegal conduct. 
C. R.D. LOGGING'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN PAY RECORDS WORKS TO 
ITS DETRIMENT. 
If an employer fails to maintain pay records, the employee need only present a 
prime facie case that he is entitled to benefits under the FLSA. Then, the burden shifts to 
the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or 
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with evidence to negative the reasonableness of any inferences to be drawn from the 
employee's evidence. 
This standard was set forth by the United States Supreme Court 56 years ago in 
case of Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90 L. Ed. 
1515 (1946). There, the Court held: 
An employee who brings suit under §16 (b) of the Act for unpaid minimum 
wages or unpaid overtime compensation, together with liquidated damages, 
has the burden of proving that he performed work for which he was not 
properly compensated. The remedial nature of this statute and the great 
public policy which it embodies, however, militate against making that 
burden an impossible hurdle for the employee. Due regard must be given 
to the fact that it is the employer who has the duty under § 11 (c) of the Act 
to keep proper records of wages, hours and other conditions and practices of 
employment and who is in position to know and to produce the most 
probative facts concerning the nature and amount of work performed. 
Employees seldom keep such records themselves; even if they do, the 
records may be and frequently are untrustworthy. It is in this setting that a 
proper and fair standard must be erected for the employee to meet in 
carrying out his burden of proof. 
(Emphasis added). 
When the employer has kept proper and accurate records, the employee 
may easily discharge his burden by securing the production of those 
records. But where the employer's records are inaccurate or inadequate and 
the employee cannot offer convincing substitutes, a more difficult problem 
arises. The solution, however, is not to penalize the employee by 
denying him any recovery on the ground that he is unable to prove the 
precise extent of uncompensated work. Such a result would place a 
premium on an employer's failure to keep proper records in conformity with 
his statutory duty; it would allow the employer to keep the benefits of an 
employee's labors without paying due compensation as contemplated by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. In such a situation we hold that an employee has 
carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for 
which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient 
evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and 
reasonable inference. The burden then shifts to the employer to come 
forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with 
16 
evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from 
the employees evidence. If the employer fails to produce such evidence, the 
court may then award damages to the employee, even though the result be 
only approximate. See Note, 43 Col. L. Rev. 355. 
(Emphasis added). 
The employer cannot be heard to complain that the damages lack the 
exactness and precision of measurement that would be possible had he kept 
records in accordance with the requirements of §11 (c) of the Act. And even 
where the lack of accurate records grows out of a bona fide mistake as to 
whether certain activities or non-activities constitute work, the employer, 
having received the benefits of such work, cannot object to the payment for 
the work on the most accurate basis possible under the circumstances. Nor 
is such a result to be condemned by the rule that precludes the recovery of 
uncertain and speculative damages. That rule applies only to situations 
where the fact of damage is itself uncertain. 
But here we are assuming that the employee has proved that he has 
performed work and has not been paid in accordance with the statute. The 
damage is therefore certain. The uncertainty lies only in the amount of 
damages arising from the statutory violation by the employer. In such a case 
"it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to 
deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from 
making any amend for his acts." Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 
U.S. 555, 563, 515 S. Ct. 248, 75 L. Ed. 544 (1931). It is enough under 
these circumstances if there is a basis for a reasonable inference as to the 
extent of the damages. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 
359, 377-379, 47 S. Ct. 400, 71 L. Ed. 684 (1927); Palmer v. Connecticut 
R. Co., 311 U.S. 544, 560-561; Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 
251, 263-266, 66 S. Ct. 574, 90 L. Ed. 652 (1946). 
(Emphasis added) 
Obviously, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a strong stance on this issue. If an 
employer has failed to keep required records, the employer must not be allowed to benefit 
from such illegal activity. 
17 
D. DADAY MET HIS BURDEN OF PRESENTING A PRIME FACIA CASE OF 
ENTITLEMENT TO OVERTIME BENEFITS 
As articulated by the Court in Clemens where the employer fails to maintain 
records he is required to maintain, the solution is not to penalize the employee by denying 
him recovery on the grounds that he is unable to prove the precise extent of the 
uncompensated work. 
However, in this case the trial court did penalize Daday for that exact reason. The 
trial court specifically held that neither plaintiff or his wife had, "credible evidence of any 
specific number of hours worked in any specific week." (Emphasis added). (R. 60; See 
also. Addendum "C" at 2). That clearly violates the standard set forth in Clemens. 
Further, there are numerous cases holding that an employee has met his burden with oral 
testimony regarding the hours he has worked even with no other evidence to support his 
claim.1 
In Wirtz v. McClure, 333 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1964), the only evidence regarding the 
hours worked was the employee's testimony that he would follow his schedule and would 
work additional time loading and unloading a truck. The trial court determined that was 
insufficient evidence to show the employee was not compensated in accordance with the 
FLSA. The 10lh Circuit Court of Appeals overruled that determination as being "clearly 
erroneous" indicating that, "the position of the trial court appears to be have been that the 
burden was on the secretary to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the actual hours 
1
 In researching 10th Circuit Court opinions, Daday is unable to find one case where oral 
testimony alone v/as insufficient to meet the Plaintiffs burden. 
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d 
worked and not paid for within the requirements of the act." However, where the 
employer failed to keep employee records, "the testimony of the employee made out a 
prime facia case." Wirtz v. McClure, 333 F.2d 45, 47 (10th Cir. 1964). 
In Porter v. Poindexter, 158 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1947), the evidence before the 
court was simply testimony of the employee that he had worked from 7:00 in the evening 
until 5:00 in the morning with the exception of Saturdays and Sundays when he would 
leave work at 6:00. The court found that this was sufficient to meet the Plaintiffs burden 
and benefits were awarded. 
In this case, the trial court seems to indicate it is relevant that Daday was asked to 
keep his own pay records, but refused. However, in the very similar case of Bledsoe v. 
Wirtz, 384 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1967), the employer made these same futile argument. 
There the employer challenged the employee' testimony, arguing that it was the employee 
who was charged with keeping his time records and that as theirs was a seasonal business, 
the employee could not have possibly spent sufficient hours working as he claimed. The 
court, however, found that this testimony fell short of the "accurate estimates" referred to 
by te Supreme Court in Mt. Clemens and would not require the district court to reject the 
"reasonable inferences" as set forth in Mt. Clemens. Further, the court found that, "the 
duty to keep records rests solely with the employer and failure to comply with this 
obligation to keep records shifts to the employer the burden of specifically and expressly 
rebutting the reasonable inferences drawn from the employee's evidence as to the amount 
of time spent working." Id. citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 
(1946). 
19 
The trial court further seems to indicate that the fact Daday took smoking breaks 
was relevant. However, there is absolutely no requirement that an employee spend all of 
his time in active work. The FLSA specifically allows an employee "idle" time. 
Under the Act, an employee must be compensated for all hours worked. As 
a general rule the terms 'hours worked' will include: (a) all time during 
which the employee is required to be on duty or to be on the employer's 
premises, or at a prescribed workplace and (b) all time during which an 
employee is suffered or permitted to work whether or not he is required to 
do so. Thus, working time is not limited to the hours spent in active, 
productive labor, but includes time given by the employer even though 
part of the time may be spent in idleness. (Emphasis added). 
29C.F.R. §778.223. 
The trial court's determination that Daday smoked a pack of cigarettes a day and 
generally did that outside is entirely irrelevant. As indicated above, the law recognizes 
that an individual is entitled to some idle time during a day and he is required to be 
compensated for the same. 
In failing to recognize that where an employer fails to maintain pay records, the 
employee only has the burden of proving a prime facia, case the trial court reached 
conclusions which are incorrect as a matter of law. As such, the determination of the trial 
court should be reversed finding that Daday presented his prime facia case, that he 
worked 60 hours per week during the time periods claimed, that R. D. Logging failed to 
meet its burden and remanding this matter back to the trial court for a determination as to 
liquidated damages, attorney fees and costs. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO OPEN THE RECORD WAS AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION 
The only person who testified at the time of trial as to the exact number of hours 
Daday worked was Daday. The employer attempted to discredit his testimony, but there 
was never any testimony, as indicated in the Findings of Fact of the judge that anyone 
else had testified as to the amount of hours worked by Daday. (R. 59-64; See also, 
Addendum " C a t 1-6). 
During closing arguments, and for the first time, it was asserted that Daday worked 
only 40 hours per week. (R. 73 at 20). Daday objected to that argument on the grounds 
that Defendant was estopped from making such a claim as its answer to interrogatories 
stated that Daday was working at least 45 hours per week. (R. 73 at 21). The Court 
denied Daday's motion and allowed R.D. Logging to continue to argue in complete 
disregard of its sworn answers to discovery. (R. 73 at 21). 
Thereafter, Daday moved to reopen the record for the sole purpose of entering into 
evidence the interrogatory from R.D. Logging admitting Daday was working 45 hours per 
week. (R. 73 at 23-7). The Court ignored the motion and entered a determination that 
Daday's evidence that he was working in excess of 40 hours per week was not credible. 
That was an abuse of discretion. 
Daday recognizes that a determination whether to reopen the record is an issue 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Lewis v. Porter, 555 P.2d 496, 497 
(Utah 1976). However, the Court must make a determination as to whether to reopen "in 
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light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in the interest of fairness and substantial 
justice." Id. 
The Court should consider whether something unexpected will be received into 
evidence as the result of a motion being granted. See, A.K. & R. Whipple Pig. and Htg. v. 
Aspen Cons., 977 P.2d 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Other important factors include 
whether the proposed witness was present in court, or a delay would be caused by 
reopening the evidence. Additionally, it is important to determine whether the non 
moving party's rights would be prejudiced. See, Ross v. Leftwich, 2>11 P.2d 495 (Utah 
1963). If there is no such prejudice, the motion should be granted. See, Ross v. Leftwich, 
377 P.2d 495 (Utah 1963). It is an abuse of discretion if the trial court refuses to open the 
evidence results in an inequitable or unjust result. Davis v. Riley, 437 P.2d 453 (Utah 
1968). 
In Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that it was an abuse of discretion in denying a motion to reopen to present 
evidence of reasonable attorney fees for the exact reasons set forth in Davis and Ross. 
Namely, it would result in an inequitable or unjust result and where the evidence would 
only present a trifle in delay. Id at 784. 
In Ross v. Leftwich, 377 P.2d 495 (Utah 1963) after plaintiff had rested and 
motions to dismiss were made, the Court indicated there was no proof on an issue which 
was critical to the case. Counsel for Plaintiff immediately moved to reopen for the 
purpose of supplying such proof. The trial court denied the motion as not being timely. 
Reversing that decision, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "[ijnasmuch as the motion 
2? 
was timely made and the evidence adduced strongly inferred that the equipment had been 
used on that particular job, and further, that the defendants would not be placed at a 
disadvantage, the motion should have been granted. Id. at 74. 
In this situation, Daday's motion to reopen the evidence was made when both 
plaintiff and defendant were present in the courtroom. There certainly would be no delay 
in receiving the interrogatory answer into evidence. R.D. Logging certainly would not be 
surprised by admission of the interrogatory as it was its own sworn answer. The motion 
was made only when counsel for R.D. Logging began making argument which 
contradicted his client's own sworn answers to discovery. The motion was made solely 
for the introduction of one answer to interrogatory. The answer clearly supported 
Daday's testimony that he worked in excess of 45 hours per week. 
There is no legitimate basis why the trial court wouldn't consider the interrogatory. 
Conversely, there is substantial reason for the Court to ignore the answer. The trial court 
made a determination that Daday's evidence lacked credibility. Obviously, that finding 
by the trial court would be controverted by R.D. Logging's own admission. As such, the 
determination by the trial court in ignoring the motion to reopen is arbitrary and 
capricious. At the very least, this Court should enter an order awarding benefits for the 
one year period of time claimed at the rate of 45 hours per week, and remand this matter 
back to the District Court for a determination as to liquidated damages and attorney fees. 
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CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Daday respectfully submits that the trial court erred in determining that Daday did 
not meet his burden of proof Daday's burden is that of simply presenting a prime facia 
case of entitlement to overtime benefits. That burden was met. R.D. Logging did not 
meet its burden of proof in rebutting Daday's prime facia case and this Court should enter 
an order awarding compensatory damages to Daday in the amount of $28,080.00, and 
remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of liquidated damages and 
attorney fees. 
Alternately, as the trial court erred in refusing to allow Daday to admit R.D. 
Logging's own admission that Daday had worked five hours of overtime per week and an 
order in the amount of $7,020.00 for those additional overtime hours should be entered 
and the case should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of liquidated 
damages and attorney fees. 
DATED this Qi\ day of June, 2001. 
V -£ 
Aaron J. Prisbr&y, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the *Z-1 day of June, 2001, a copy of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postage prepaid, as follows: 
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Utah Court of Appeals (1 original) 
450 South State Street (7 copies) 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -0230 
Brent M. Brindley (2 copies) 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM, DRAKE, WADE & SMART 
PO Box 400 
St George UT 84771-0400 
Richard S. Daday (1 copy) 
572 Moorland Street 
Vallejo, CA 94589 
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Addendum "A" 
Section 207. Maximum hours 
(a) Employees engaged in interstate commerce; additional 
applicability to employees pursuant to subsequent amendatory 
provisions 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer 
shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed 
in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods 
-for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such 
employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the 
hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half 
times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
(2) No employer shall employ any of his employees who in any 
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in 
the production of goods for commerce, and who in such workweek is 
brought within the purview of this subsection by the amendments 
made to this chapter by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 
(A) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the 
first year from the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments of 1966, 
(B) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the 
second year from such date, or 
(C) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration 
of the second year from such date, 
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in 
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and 
one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 
(b) Employment pursuant to collective bargaining agreement; 
employment by independently owned and controlled local 
enterprise engaged in distribution of petroleum products 
No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of 
this section by employing any employee for a workweek in excess of 
that specified in such subsection without paying the compensation 
for overtime employment prescribed therein if such employee is so 
employed -
(1) in pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of 
collective bargaining by representatives of employees certified 
as bona fide by the National Labor Relations Board, which 
provides that no employee shall be employed more than one 
thousand and forty hours during any period of twenty-six 
consecutive weeks; or 
(2) in pursuance of an agreement, made as a result of 
collective bargaining by representatives of employees certified 
as bona fide by the National Labor Relations Board, which 
provides that during a specified period of fifty-two consecutive 
weeks the employee shall be employed not more than two thousand 
two hundred and forty hours and shall be guaranteed not less than 
one thousand eight hundred and forty-hours (or not less than 
forty-six weeks at the normal number of hours worked per week, 
but not less than thirty hours per week) and not more than two 
thousand and eighty hours of employment for which he shall 
receive compensation for all hours guaranteed or worked at rates 
not less than those applicable under the agreement to the work 
Addendum "B" 
§516.2 Employees subject to minimum wage or minimum wage and overtime provisions 
pursuant to section 6 or sections 6 and 7(a) of the Act. 
(a) Items required. Every employer shall maintain and preserve payroll or other records containing the 
following information and data with respect to each employee to whom section 6 or both sections 6 and 
7(a) of the Act apply: 
(1) Name in full, as used for Social Security recordkeeping purposes, and on the same record, the 
employee's identifying symbol or number if such is used in place of name on any time, work, or payroll 
records, 
(2) Home address, including zip code, 
(3)Dateofbirth,ifunderl9, 
(4) Sex and occupation in which employed (sex may be indicated by use of the prefixes Mr., Mrs., 
Miss., or Ms.) (Employee's sex identification is related to the equal pay provisions of the Act which are 
administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Other equal pay recordkeeping 
requirements are contained in 29 CFR part 1620.) 
(5) Time of day and day of week on which the employee's workweek begins (or for employees 
employed under section 7(k) of the Act, the starting time and length of each employee's work period). If 
the employee is part of a workforce or employed in or by an establishment all of whose workers have a 
workweek beginning at the same time on the same day, a single notation of the time of the day and 
beginning day of the workweek for the whole workforce or establishment will suffice, 
(6)(i) Regular hourly rate of pay for any workweek in which overtime compensation is due under section 
7(a) of the Act, (ii) explain basis of pay by indicating the monetary amount paid on a per hour, per day, 
per week, per piece, commission on sales, or other basis, and (iii) the amount and nature of each 
payment which, pursuant to section 7(e) of the Act, is excluded from the "regular rate" (these records 
may be in the form of vouchers or other payment data), 
(7) Hours worked each workday and total hours worked each workweek (for purposes of this section, a 
"workday" is any fixed period of 24 consecutive hours and a "workweek" is any fixed and regularly 
recurring period of 7 consecutive workdays), 
(8) Total daily or weekly straight-time earnings or wages due for hours worked during the workday or 
workweek, exclusive of premium overtime compensation, 
(9) Total premium pay for overtime hours. This amount excludes the straight-time earnings for overtime 
hours recorded under paragraph (a)(8) of this section, 
(10) Total additions to or deductions from wages paid each pay period including employee purchase 
orders or wage assignments. Also, in individual employee records, the dates, amounts, and nature of the 
items which make up the total additions and deductions, 
(11) Total wages paid each pay period, 
(12) Date of payment and the pay period covered by payment. 
(b) Records of retroactive payment of wages. Every employer who makes retroactive payment of wages 
or compensation under the supervision of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division pursuant to 
section 16(c) and/or section 17 of the Act, shall: 
(1) Record and preserve, as an entry on the pay records, the amount of such payment to each employee, 
the period covered by such payment, and the date of payment. 
(2) Prepare a report of each such payment on a receipt form provided by or authorized by the Wage and 
Hour Division, and (i) preserve a copy as part of the records, (ii) deliver a copy to the employee, and 
(iii) file the original, as evidence of payment by the employer and receipt by the employee, with the 
Administrator or an authorized representative within 10 days after payment is made. 
(c) Employees working on fixed schedules. With respect to employees working on fixed schedules, an 
employer may maintain records showing instead of the hours worked each day and each workweek as 
required by paragraph (a)(7) of this section, the schedule of daily and weekly hours the employee 
normally works. Also, 
(1) In weeks in which an employee adheres to this schedule, indicates by check mark, statement or other 
method that such hours were in fact actually worked by him, and 
(2) In weeks in which more or less than the scheduled hours are worked, shows that exact number of 
hours worked each day and each week. 
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Addendum "C" 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD S. DADAY, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
R. D. LOGGING CO, INC, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 990501638 
) Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court for trial on February 20 and 21, 2001. Plaintiff 
was present and represented by his counsel, Aaron J. Prisbrey. Defendant was present 
through Barratt Nielson and represented by its counsel, Brent M. Brindley. Several legal 
issues were raised during the trial which could and should have been raised and resolved 
prior to trial. Having considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the Court makes 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT1 
1. Plaintiff was, at all relevant times, a resident of Washington County, Utah. 
2. Defendant was, at all relevant times, a Utah corporation having its principal 
!At the conclusion of Plaintiffs case in chief, Plaintiff made certain motions on which the Court 
ruled before the beginning of Defendant's evidence. The Court's findings and conclusions are stated in the 
record of the trial, and will not be repeated here. The findings made herein are only those necessary for the 
Court's ultimate conclusions. 
place of business in Washington County, Utah. 
3. Plaintiff worked as an employee of Defendant from January 1998 through 
March 19, 1999. 
4. Defendant's business is the fabrication of custom cabinets and furniture, some 
of which have been sold in interstate commerce. 
5. Defendant was paid on a weekly basis, and was paid $720 each week of his 
employment by Defendant, except for the last week thereof; Defendant was never paid any 
overtime compensation. 
6. Plaintiff was originally employed by Defendant to be a manager of Defendant' s 
shop; Plaintiff testified, "I [could] run it [the shop] as though it were my own." 
7. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant kept records of Plaintiffs work hours; 
Defendant tried to get Plaintiff to record his work hours, but Plaintiff refused to do so. 
8. Plaintiff testified that he consistently worked more than forty hours per week 
for Defendant. Plaintiff testified that sixty hours per week "is a real safe average," but 
Plaintiff had no credible evidence of any specific number of hours worked in any specific 
week. The Court finds this testimony to be speculative, unsubstantiated, and unreliable. 
9. Plaintiff s wife testified that Plaintiff worked many hours at Defendant's shop, 
but had no credible evidence of any specific number of hours worked in any specific week. 
10. Plaintiff testified that he began work at 6:30 a.m., but witness Richard Carnley 
testified that Plaintiff arrived no earlier than 7:00 a.m. 
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11. Plaintiff testified that his "average" work day ended at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m.. 
Witness Gary Slease testified that, on certain unidentified occasions, he saw Plaintiff 
working at Defendant's shop as late as 6:00 p.m., but he could not testify about what work 
Defendant was doing. Witness Camley testified that Plaintiff was at the shop longer than 
other employees. 
12. Plaintiff testified that he worked six or seven days per week until February 
1999. Defendant's witnesses testified that Sunday work was never required by Defendant 
and that Saturday work was virtually never required. The Court finds that Plaintiffs 
testimony is unreliable and is rebutted by more credible evidence. 
13. Plaintiff worked for Defendant for more than one year before claiming any 
entitlement to overtime compensation. 
14. Plaintiff spent significant time on personal work, not for Defendant, during the 
normal work hours of the shop; for example, Plaintiff built furniture to exchange for his own 
automotive repairs and built doors to trade for his own countertops. 
15. Plaintiff also parked his own travel trailer next to Defendant's shop, and 
worked on the reconstruction and remodeling of its interior during the normal work hours 
of Defendant's shop; witness Carnley testified that he saw improvements made by Plaintiff 
to his trailer which would have required three or four complete weeks of work to accomplish, 
and others of Defendant's employees who testified had witnessed Plaintiff working on his 
trailer during the normal work hours of the shop. 
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16. Defendant's representative, Barratt Nielson, testified that Plaintiff did not work 
the sixty hours per week that he claims because Plaintiff was working on his trailer during 
the normal work hours of the shop; witness Nielson further testified that he twice told 
Plaintiff to stop working on personal projects during work hours. 
17. Plaintiff testified that he took smoking breaks while at work, that he never 
smoked in the shop, and that he smoked a pack of cigarettes per day. 
18. Defendant adopted its first policy regarding sick leave and vacations on 
January 19,1999 (See Exhibit 6), two months before the end of Plaintiff s employment with 
Defendant 
Having made the foregoing findings, the Court reaches the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Plaintiffs employment with Defendant was subject to the requirements of the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FSLA"). 
B. Defendant violated provisions of the FSLA by failing to keep records of 
Plaintiffs work hours. 
C In these circumstances, Plaintiff still has the burden to prove "that [he] has in 
fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and produce[] sufficient 
evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable 
inference." 48A AmJur 2d, Labor and Labor Relations §4657. 
D. Plaintiff s testimony regarding his working of more than forty hours per week 
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is speculative, it fails to account for the time he took for smoking breaks and worked on 
personal projects rather than for Defendant, and is contradicted by more credible evidence. 
Plaintiff specifically testified, "You can't imagine the hours I put in in that place," but then 
left it to this Court to do that imagining. 
E. Plaintiff has failed to bear his burden of proof for overtime compensation. 
F. Defendant's policy for sick leave and vacations was not retroactive, and 
Plaintiff had no entitlement to compensation thereimder when his employment was 
terminated. 
G. Judgment should be entered for Defendant, with no award to Plaintiff, and the 
parties should bear their own costs and attorneys fees. 
H. Counsel for Defendant should submit an appropriate judgment pursuant to Rule 
4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Dated this cD day of March, 2001. 
(^<S\w( ^£ ) C 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
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Certificate of Mailing or Hand Delivery 
I hereby certify that on this $0 day o f - ^ ^ & ^ 2 0 0 1 , 1 provided true and correct 
copies of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each of 
the attorneys/parties named below by placing a copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's 
Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the 
United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Aaron J. Prisbrey 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Brent M. Brindley 
Attorney for Defendant 
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